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ABSTRACT
We explore the role of strategic price-discrimination by retailers for price determination and inflation
dynamics. We model two types of customers, "loyals" who buy only one brand and do not strategically
time purchases, and "shoppers" who seek out low-priced products both across brands and across time.
Shoppers always pay the lowest price available, the "best price". Retailers in this setting optimally
choose long periods of constant regular prices punctuated by frequent temporary sales. Supermarket
scanner data confirm the model's predictions: the average price paid is closely approximated by a weighted
average of the fixed weight average list price and the "best price". In contrast to standard menu cost
models, our model implies that sales are an essential part of the price plan and the number and frequency
of sales may be an important mechanism for adjustment to shocks. We conclude that our "best price"
construct provides a tractable input for constructing price series.
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We explore theoretically and empirically the importance of retailer price dis-
crimination strategies for descriptions of price dynamics. We depart from
the usual approach in the macro literature that ignores consumer heterogene-
ity in the price-setting problem and instead make this heterogeneity central
to the analysis. In particular, we posit that that some consumers are ac-
tive shoppers who chase discounts, substitute across products in a narrowly
dened product category, and potentially use storage to maintain smooth
consumption whilst concentrating their purchases in sale weeks. Other cus-
tomers are passive, and retailers will employ strategies to charge these two
groups dierent prices. Due to the actions of these strategic consumers,
we nd that weighted average prices paid dier substantially from posted
prices.
The model that we propose to account for this behavior is a model which
does not necessarily speak to nominal price rigidities. But the model does
suggest that conscious price discrimination rather than restrictions on the
ability of rms to change prices (such as menu costs) is critical for under-
standing price dynamics. In the context of our framework, the most natural
way to understand nominal rigidities would be to look to the consumer side
of the pricing problem rather than the rm side. But even without taking a
stand on this issue, the evidence we develop does speak to a pair of debates
that have emerged amongst macroeconomists looking at micro data.
For example, there is a measurement question of whether (and poten-
tially how) intermittent price discounts, or \sales", should be incorporated
in price index construction. Since episodic sales occur quite frequently in
some sectors, price series that ignore sale prices display infrequent price
changes, while price series that contain sales prices display very frequent
price changes. Nakumura and Steinsson (2008) estimate a median price du-
ration of approximately 5 months including sales, and approximately 8 to
11 months excluding them. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) nd that consid-
ering only regular (e.g., non-sale) prices raises the estimated median price
duration in their dataset from 3.7 months to 7.2 months. In general, many
researchers have documented that the price series for a given product from
retailers such as grocery stores exhibit long periods of a constant regular
price punctuated by occasional sales. These measurement issues come to
the fore when macroeconomists must decide how to calibrate models that
presume that prices are sticky. Our empirical analysis argues strongly for
keeping track of sale prices because they play a major role in governing
stores' prots and our model suggests that their depth and/or frequency
2could be altered to adjust to shocks.
Likewise, a largely theoretical literature has emerged to look at the
micro-foundations for why sales exist. For example, Matejka (2010) builds
on the literature of rational inattention (see Sims (1998, 2003), Mankiw and
Reis(2002,2006), for example) to explore its implications for price setting.
In his model rms do not know the exact cost of the good each is selling and
the rms nd it expensive to keep track of all the information that would
be necessary to perfectly deduce this cost. Thus, rms must decide which
cost signals to monitor and because of their nite processing ability will set
prices based on the estimated distribution of cost. In order to economize
on information, the seller chooses signals that lead to a small number of
distinct prices. Sales in this framework corresponding to situations in which
a signal suggests that costs were low.
There is a complementary long literature, beginning with Varian (1980)
and Sobel (1984) that rationalize price-discrimination strategies that include
temporary discounts. Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011) were the rst to bring
this perspective to the macroeconomic literature on price-setting. Like us,
they assume heterogeneous consumers. They have two types of consumers,
bargain hunters and loyal shoppers, who are price insensitive; they explore
how price discrimination plays out when retailers compete to sell to these
customers. The key nding in their analysis is that competition bounds the
importance of sales as a mechanism to adjust to shocks.
Interestingly, the theoretical results in Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011)
contrast the empirical results of Klenow and Willis (2007), who nd that
sale prices are just as responsive to macroeconomic conditions as regular
prices. That is, Klenow and Willis nd that the depth of sales decreases
when recent in
ation has been high and that sales prices give way to higher
regular prices when recent in
ation has been high.
Our contribution is largely empirical, but to guide the analysis we begin
by introducing a model in the spirit of Varian (1980), Sobel (1984), and Pe-
sendorfer (2002) that allows for the possibility that pricing strategies might
involve variation in the usage of discount prices. In contrast to the previous
literature, we focus explicitly on a retailer controlling the prices of multiple
products. The robust implication of this kind of model is that store pricing
patterns ought to re
ect the presence of dierent consumers and be strate-
gically coordinated across products. The model can account for frequent
temporary sales and long periods of constant regular prices. Furthermore,
even with unchanging costs and demand, optimal markups are not held con-
stant across items or across time. In contrast to Guimaraes and Sheedy, our
model also implies that changing the frequency and depth of sales is the
3optimal response to cost shocks and to certain kinds of demand shocks.
To quantify the importance of consumer heterogeneity we turn to de-
tailed microeconomic data. Some of our data are for particular supermar-
ket products collected over parts of seven years at Dominick's Finer Foods
(DFF), a supermarket chain in the Chicago area. We also analyze data for a
later seven-year period, using a dataset provided by Symphony IRI. The IRI
dataset covers stores in 47 markets around the country and we (randomly)
selected one store in each of the nine census regions for evaluation. Prices for
individual products at DFF and at the IRI stores display the now-familiar
pattern of very infrequent regular price changes combined with frequent
temporary sales. But upon more careful scrutiny, it appears that purchase
patterns associated with the sales clearly re
ect the important role played
by bargain hunters. In particular, we show three sets of results.
First, the model suggests that average prices paid for goods within a
bundle of close substitutes are the relevant price for consumers and retailers.
Because retailers time sales strategically, the model suggests, and the data
show, that sales for close substitute products tend not to occur in the same
weeks. Consumers, we show, chase sales, and thus, actual prices paid are
substantially lower than regular prices, and even measurably below average
posted prices.
Second, we introduce the concept of a \best price", dened as the lowest
price charged for any good in the narrow product category during a short
multi-week time window. The model predicts that \best prices" should be
the relevant prices for sales-chasing consumers. We show that the actual
price paid tracks the \best price" and is well-approximated by an average
of the best price and the xed weight price index. The data match the
structural form of our model.
Third, the data exhibit strong spillovers in quantities purchased due to
price changes for close substitutes. So, for example, when the price of Minute
Maid orange juice is reduced for a temporary discount, sales of Tropicana
orange juice plunge (provided the Tropicana price does not change). In
previous literature, large quantity variation along with constant prices has
lead to a diagnosis of substantial demand variability. However, we show that
much of this apparent demand volatility derives from choices made by the
retailer in setting prices for substitute products. For example, we show that
total ounces sold of all products within a narrow product category are much
less volatile than total ounces sold of any individual product suggesting that
while customers actively shift between items when they go on sale, making
individual demand quite volatile, the total demand across all the relevant
items is much more stable.
4We read the evidence as suggesting that the models of price setting that
emphasize consumers taste, cognitive processing, or information-gathering
deserve more attention. For instance, in our model, occasional sales provide
a tool for retailers to eectively charge dierent consumers dierent prices
and pricing decisions are driven by the dierent consumer groups' reservation
prices. Thus, how consumers update reservation prices for individual goods
becomes a critical factor aecting in
ation. This mechanism has been much
less explored than have those which emphasize rms costs of changing prices.
Similarly, price index construction may need to be revised to account for
the importance of bargain hunters. We provide some preliminary thoughts
on how this might be done.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the simple model of
a price-discriminating retailer and highlights empirical predictions. Section
3 describes the data. Section 4 establishes a number of new facts about
pricing and purchase patterns that are consistent with the model. Section
5 discusses how to use our model to measure and summarize price series.
Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model of Price Discriminating Retailers and
Heterogeneous Consumers
We begin by presenting a simple model that is similar in spirit to, and bor-
rows signicantly from, Varian (1980), Sobel (1984), or Pesendorfer (2002).
The baseline version of our model takes consumer heterogeneity as its prim-
itive. The rm knows about this heterogeneity and accounts for it in price
setting. In this model, the rm bears no menu cost of changing prices.
Nonetheless, we will show that the rm will iterate between a small number
of prices, even in the face of some cost changes and some types of demand
changes. The \regular" price will change infrequently but \sales" will be
utilized. The model suggests that it is possible that the retailer will respond
to a nominal shock by changing the frequency of sales while holding the
\regular" price xed.
2.1 Model Assumptions
Consider a retailer selling two substitute dierentiated products, A and B.
We will focus on a single retailer for simplicity. However, we note that it
would be fairly straightforward to embed our model into a model of two
retailers competing in geographic space. In such a model (see, for example,
5Lal and Matutes (1994), Pesendorfer (2002) and Hosken and Reien (2007)),
consumer reservation prices would be determined by the price that would
trigger consumer travel to another store. Thus, for tractability, we focus on
a single retailer, but a monopoly assumption is not necessary. We discuss
the competitive case more below.
Assume that all customers have unit demand in each period but are
dierentiated in their preferences for the two substitute goods. A share
=2 of the customers value product A at V H and product B at V L, where
V H > V L. We call these consumers the high A types. For convenience, we
consider the symmetric case where a share =2 of the customers, the high B
types, value product B at V H and product A at V L. The remaining share of
consumers (1   ), the \bargain hunters", value both products at V L. We
normalize the total number of consumers to be 1 and consider N shopping
periods.1
The seller has a constant returns to scale technology of producing A and
B and the marginal cost of producing either is c.
Each period, customers arrive at the retailer to shop. Consider the
choices for the high A types (which will be symmetric for the high B types).
If the price is less than or equal to their reservation value (PA < V H), then
they buy their preferred good, A. If PA > V H and the price for product B
is less than or equal to their reservation price for B (PB < V L), the high
A type customers substitute to good B. If PA > V H and PB > V L, then
the high A types make no purchase. For simplicity we also assume that, if
the high types do not buy, their demand for the period is extinguished so
that next period there are no implications of them having been out of the
market.2
Next consider the choices made by the bargain hunters. If PA < V L
and/or PB < V L, they will buy whichever product is cheaper.3 If PA > V L
and PB > V L, the bargain hunters do not buy. However, we capture the idea
of shoppers being willing to engage in intertemporal storage by assuming
that their demand partially accumulates to successive periods, deteriorating
at rate 1-. Thus, for example, if they made a purchase in period t   1,
1In our model, V
H and V
L are real. However, it is possible that one or both types of
consumer have nominal illusion. This would in
uence the retailer's optimal response to
changes in monetary policy. We leave exploration of this set of issues to future work.
2In our model, as long as costs are less than V
H, the rm will always set price so
that the high types purchase. We could make an assumption about high type demand
accumulating, but it wouldn't have any important implications for the model.
3We will see that in equilibrium it will not be prot maximizing to put both goods on
sale in the same week.
6but PA = PB = V H in period t so that no purchases are made, then their
total demand entering period t + 1 will be (1   ) + (1   ). Similarly, if
a good was available at a price of V L in period t   1, but PA = PB = V H
in periods t, t + 1, ..., t + (k   1), total demand from the bargain hunters
in period k will equal:
(1   )(1 +  + 2 +  + k) = (1   )
(1   k)
1   
if 0 <  < 1:
Note then, that we are assuming that the high types are inactive shoppers
|they do not wait for and/or stock up during bargains, while the low types
do. In this sense, our model re
ects well the empirical facts described in
Aguiar and Hurst (2007), in which they document that some consumers in
a local area pay systematically lower prices for the same goods as other
consumers. That is, some consumers are strategic in bargain-hunting, and
others are not.4
Total prots for the retailer depend on the total amount of A and B
sold. The retailer has three basic choices: (i) the retailer can charge high
prices and service only the high types, foregoing any potential margins to
be earned on the low types. (ii) the retailer can charge low prices and serve
both types of customers, thus foregoing the extra willingness to pay that
could have been extracted from the high types. Or (iii) the retailer can
strategically iterate between high and low prices in an attempt to capture
some of the potential demand from the bargain-hunters while exploiting
some of the extra willingness to pay of the high types.
2.2 Model Results
Depending on the parameters, strategy (i), (ii), or (iii), described above can
be optimal. We will explain when each is optimal, with particular attention
to parameter values under which (iii) is optimal, since the pricing behavior
associated with (iii) is roughly consistent with our empirical observation of
occasional sales at supermarkets. We characterize the retailer's behavior in
several steps.
Proposition 1: As long as V L > c, the optimal price in any period is
either V L or V H.
4As in Pesendorfer (2002), we combine \bargain-hunting" behavior with low willingness
to pay. We could provide a more detailed model with more types|brand loyals who are
willing to intertemporally substitute purchases, brand loyals who do not intertemporally
substitute, non-loyals who are willing to intertemporally substitute and non-loyals who do
not intertemporally substitute. We think most of the interesting implications are evident
with these 4 types collapsed into the two extremes.
7Sketch of Proof: Choosing a price between V H and V L would reduce
margins on the high types but would produce no osetting demand increase
for the bargain hunters. Thus, the optimal price is either V H or V L.
Proposition 2: It is never optimal to charge V L for both good A and
good B in the same period.
Sketch of Proof: Charging V L for the second good leads to a loss of
margins on the high types that prefer that good, but produces no osetting
demand increase for the bargain hunters. The bargain hunters' demand is
satised by charging V L for either good. This delivers one of the prediction
that we will test empirically, namely that discount periods or \sales" for
products within a product category are not synchronized.
Thus, we have shown that the retailer will charge V H for at least one
good in every period, and may charge V L for one good in some periods.
Below, we show the conditions under which the retailer will charge V L for
one good in every period, conditions under which the retailer will never
charge V L for either good, and conditions under which the retailer will
charge V L for one good in some periods but not all periods (intermittent
sales). In order to derive these results, we rst provide two straightforward
intermediate results.
Proposition 3: If the retailer chooses to hold one and only one sale during
the N periods, then the optimal time to hold it will be in the Nth (nal)
period.
Sketch of Proof: If the retailer charges V H for both products during
N   1 periods, and V L for one product in 1 period, prots will be:
(N   1)(V H   c) +

2
(V L   c) +

2
(V H   c) +
(1   k)
1   
(1   )(V L   c) (1)
where k represents the period in which the sale is held. The rst term of (1)
is the prots from the high types in all of the non-sales periods, the second
and third term represent the prots from the high types in the sale period
(if the sale is on A, the high A types pay V L, but the high B types still
pay V H). The fourth term of (1) represents the prots from the bargain
hunters. Note that the rst three terms are invariant to the timing of the
single sale. The fourth term is maximized when k = N (as long as  > 0).
Proposition 4; For a retailer who chooses to hold j sales (i.e. charge V L
in j periods), the optimal strategy is to hold evenly spaced sales every k
periods, where k = N=j.
8Sketch of Proof: The prior proposition covered the case of j = 1 and
k = N. Note that the logic underlying Proposition 3 for the entire period
carries forward straightforwardly to sub-periods, so within each sub-period
it makes sense to delay the sale as long as possible. Hence sales will be
equally spaced.
With the results of Propositions 3 and 4 in hand, we can characterize
the remaining decision about when it pays to have any sales at all. We
consider a retailer who holds a sale every kth period. If k = 1, the retailer
holds a sale every period. If k = N, the retailer holds the minimum positive
number of sales|one sale at the end to \sweep up" the low demanders. If
k > N, the retailer never holds sales. We will focus on interior solutions
where 1 < k < N.
We consider the prots of a retailer who charges PA = PB = V H every
period except during a \sale" and holds a sale at P = V L for one or the
other good every kth period. Assuming no discounting, total prots for this



















(1   )(V L   c) (2)
The four terms in (2) are very intuitive. The rst piece represents the
prots from selling to the high types only, which will occur during all the
non-sale periods. The second term is the prots from the high types during
the periods where they are able to buy their preferred good on sale; during
these sale periods the other high type still pays V H so that explains the
third term. The last term is the prots from the bargain hunters. Note
that, the larger  is, the less the bargain hunters' demand has depreciated
by the time the sale is held.
Proposition 5: The retailer will nd it optimal to hold some sales if:

2
(V H   V L) < (1   )
1   N
1   
(V L   c) ,





(V L   c) (3)
Sketch of Proof: The left hand side of rst expression shows the loss
from allowing the high types to pay less than they are willing to pay by
oering a single sale. The right hand side of the rst expression gives the
prots from selling to the bargain hunters in an optimally timed single sale.
9The second expression in (3) helps build intuition. Essentially, holding
at least one sale will be optimal as long as V L is large \enough" relative
to c and relative to V H and if there are enough bargain hunters. The total
demand of the bargain hunters depends on both their share in the population
and the extent to which their unmet demand cumulates. An increase in the
share of bargain hunters (or increase the persistence of their demand) will
lead to more sales.
Note also that, if the stock of consumers depreciates completely ( = 0)
from period to period, then the condition degenerates to the condition for
prots from charging the low price being higher than prots from charging
the high price (period by period):

2






(V L   c)
Assume that the condition in Proposition 5 holds so that the retailer
will hold at least 1 sale. By construction, for given values of , , V H, V L,
and c, the seller will then choose k to maximize (2). That is, the seller
will deterministically hold a sale every kth period. We are assuming that k
and N are positive integers. However, we can examine comparative statics
involving the optimal choice of k by treating these functions as continuous
and maximizing prots with respect to k. We are considering the cases here
where N is large.










(V H   c)   (2   )(V L   c)   (V H   V L)
2e(1   )(V L   c)

(4)
Where W() is the Product Log or Lambert function. The Lambert function
provides the solution for z such that z = W(z)eW(z). It is used extensively
to model time delay problems in operations research|a family of problems
akin to the timing of sales problem studied here. Note that, since k is the
number of periods between sales, a larger k means less frequent sales.
While analytic solutions are unavailable, by xing some parameters we
can present a few interesting and illustrative comparative statics numerically.
For example, consider the case where V H = 4, c = 1,  = 0:9,  = 0:4.
Figure 1 shows the optimal k for V L varying from 0 to 4.
Not surprisingly k is decreasing in V L: the higher the valuation of the
low valuation types, the shorter the time between sales; serving the low
10valuation types is attractive. Note that k is not dened if V L is too low,
because at some point it ceases to make sense to have sales. Also, note that
as V L ! V H = 4, the optimal k falls below 1. That is, as V L gets large
enough, it makes sense to charge V L for one product every period.
Alternatively consider the eect of c on the optimal k. Fix V H = 4,
 = 0:9,  = 0:4 as before, and x V L = 2. Figure 2 shows that, as would
be expected k is increasing in c: the greater is marginal cost, the lower the
prots from serving the bargain hunters and the less frequently one would
want to hold sales. As c ! V L = 2, k ! 1.
Given the structure of our model, the rm is always charging V H when
there is not a sale. So changes in marginal cost that are unaccompanied
by changes in buyer willingness to pay will not result in a change in the
non-sale price.
Lastly, consider changes in , the share of customers with high willing-
ness to pay for one of the goods. As before, x V H = 4, V L = 2, c = 1,
and  = 0:9. Figure 3 shows the optimal k as  ranges from 0 to 1. As 
increases, i.e. the share of bargain hunters falls, sales become less attractive.
If  = 1, optimal k is innite, because sales are never attractive.
From the retailer's point of view the relevant \price plan" is the full se-
quence of high and low prices that prevail over the cycle of 2k periods. Note
that even with unchanging cost and demand parameters, for many param-
eter values, the rm changes prices from period to period as it optimally
iterates between capturing rents from high types and capturing the demand
of the \bargain hunter" low types. Fixing tastes and technology in this set
up, the main choice variable of the retailer is k. PA and PB are choices in
each period but are set by the willingness to pay of the consumer types.
It is useful to compare the outcomes of this model to the models proposed
in Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) and Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo
(2011). Both of those models can produce a result of a rm charging a
xed regular price and sometimes charging a sale price. However, in both
of these papers, the decision to charge a sale price is driven by some change
in the cost or demand environment. In our model, a sale would occur every
k weeks with no change in the cost or demand environment.
It is also useful to compare this model to Pesendorfer (2002), the mi-
croeconomic model that ours most closely resembles. In Pesendorfer, the
sale decision is stochastic, but shocks to cost are an important driver of the
decision to hold a sale.
Another important distinction between all of these models and ours is
that none of these models explicitly examine a retailer managing a portfolio
of close substitute products. Indeed, the fact that cost drivers are important
11in these models implies that the prices for close substitute products would
tend to be positively correlated. In our model, the time series of prices for
close substitute products are negatively correlated (unless a common shock
leads to the change in V L and V H).
Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011) share the feature of our model that sales
are not driven primarily by cost shocks. Their model, like Sobel (1984),
examines two competitors (competing brands or competing retailers) chasing
a xed pool of bargain hunters. They do not examine a single retailer
managing a portfolio of close substitute products. In their model, sales will
not be negatively correlated across competing brands.
It is also useful to enumerate the circumstances in our model that would
lead to a change in the regular price. The regular price is held constant if
there are shocks to any of the following parameters: V L, c, , and . If any
of those parameters change, the retailer's optimal response is to alter the
frequency or depth of sales.
One way to combine the comparative statics described above is to sim-
ulate the model allowing for changes in preferences and costs, under the
assumption that the seller expects each change to be permanent. In the
following gure we x the persistence of unmet demand, but allow the share
of the bargain hunters, the valuations of the bargain hunters and high types,
and marginal cost to each change once per quarter. In this experiment the
taste/cost shocks occur every thirteen weeks.
A resulting price path from this simulation for good A is plotted in
Figure 4. Having allowed for a full set of shocks, the model now predicts
changes in prices, the frequency of sales and the size of the discount that
occurs during a sale. While our model is highly stylized, the price pattern
from our simulation in Figure 4 does look extremely similar to a price series
for substitute grocery products.
Finally, it is helpful to use the model to think about quantities sold. In
the simplest case where demand does not deteriorate at all from period to
period but just stockpiles ( = 1), total units purchased over all periods
equals N, independent of the number and frequency of sales. This follows
literally from the assumption of unit demand per period. But even so, the
number of units sold in each individual period, however, is a function of the
timing of sales; bargain hunters move all of their demand into sale periods.
The only distortion in total units purchased over all N periods relative
to the scenario in which PA = PB = V L in all periods stems from the
deterioration in bargain hunter demand while waiting for sales. Thus, for






12Note that, in any individual period, sales of an individual good could be
as low as =2 and as large as +k(1 ), if the good is on sale and deterio-
ration of \bargain hunter" demand is negligible. Note that this volatility in
demand across products and periods occurs despite the static environment
that we modelled; quantity sold varies across periods and across goods de-
spite the fact that the demand and supply primitives are constant through
time. This implies that, while individual good sales are volatile period by
period, by summing across goods A and B the total amount sold will be in-
variant across k-period cycles. Building on this prediction, we look whether
the volatility in quantities sold are smaller for a collection of close substi-
tutes over a full cycle of weeks that include at least one discount, than in
individual weeks or for individual goods.
The preceding results are also helpful for thinking about actual prices
paid. Summing over all periods and the products A and B, V H will be
the price charged in at least half of the product-periods. In cases in which
there are interior solutions for k (as depicted above), V H will be the price
charged in more than half of all product-periods. Specically, if A and
B are discounted equally frequently, the share of periods in which a given
product is \on sale" is 1=2k. Thus, applying the algorithms proposed by
either Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2011) or Kehoe and Midrigan
(2010) would identify V H as the regular/reference price for both goods. A
\xed weight" index measuring average price over the entire period would







This price (and certainly the \regular" price) does not capture aver-
age price from the retailer's perspective or from the perspective of the
bargaining-hunting customer. The actual price paid puts much more weight
on the low price, because it re
ects the strategic shift of the bargain-hunters
into the low priced product (when one is on sale) and the stockpiling of
bargain hunter demand (when nothing is on sale).
This is easiest to see by rst neglecting/assuming away the deterioration
in bargain hunter demand. With no demand deterioration, average revenue
per unit equals:






Of course, we know that lower prices expand demand, but in this case,
that factor is magnied by the presence of multiple products that bargain
13hunters view as substitutes and because bargain hunters stockpile demand.
It will be very helpful to note the relationship between (5) and (6). Recall
that (5) is the xed weight index and that (6) is the average revenue per
unit or actual price paid. Note also that the lowest or \best price" achieved
over the k period sales cycle is V L. The average price paid in (6) can be










+ (1   )V L (7)
That is, the actual price paid in (6) is equal a weighted average of the xed
weight price index in (5) and the \best price", where the share of loyals and
of bargain hunters in the population are the weights.
The average revenue per unit (or actual price paid per unit) is more
complicated when demand deterioration is taken into account. The weighted



















The average revenue in (8) approaches that in (7), or equivalently (6), as
 approaches 1. For  < 1, the weighted average price in (8) is slightly higher
than in (6) because demand deterioration destroys some of the demand when
sale prices are not oered. Thus, the average revenue per unit, or actual
price paid, is a weighted average of the price paid by the high types, and
the price paid by the low types.
Note also from (8) that, if  is small, then as  approaches 0, the weighted
average price will approach the \best price"|the lowest price posted for
any of the substitute products within the k period planning cycle. Note also
that if  is fairly small and if  is small and V H remains constant for a long
period of time, then a time series of the weighted average price will resemble
a xed increment over the time series of the \best price". If  is very large,
then the weighted average price will more closely resemble the \regular" or
\reference" price. For small to modest values of  and intermediate values
of , the price paid resembles a weighted average of the \best" price and
the xed price index as illustrate in (7). We examine these possibilities in
the next section.
Our model is highly stylized and so we discuss ways in which it may
be extended. First, the model extends straightforwardly to more substitute
14goods. One can imagine more complex demand relationships that could
be exploited by the retailer. For example, in our model, each product is
associated with a cadre of brand-loyal consumers. However, it is possible
that the retailing landscape includes some goods for which some consumers
are brand loyal and other goods for which no consumers are brand loyal
(possibly private label goods).
Furthermore, there are numerous ways to contemplate an extension of
the model to multiple types. In particular, as mentioned above, there may
be some consumers who inter-temporally substitute actively, but are highly
brand loyal. There may be other consumers who are not brand loyal but
do not inter-temporally substitute. In these more complex cases, the for-
mulation and intuition in (6) is particularly helpful. Specically, we can
think of the prices paid for a set of closely related goods over a shopping
cycle as being characterized by the weighted average of the prices paid by
non-bargain hunter loyal shoppers and the prices paid by bargain hunters.
As shown above, the prices paid by the loyal shoppers are essentially a xed
weight average of the prices posted. However, the prices paid by bargain
hunters more closely resemble the lowest price charged for any substitute
good over a reasonable shopping horizon. In a model with more types, the
pricing outcomes will be as in (6) but the weights on the dierent prices will
re
ect the behavior of the dierent consumer types.
Also, while there is a long tradition of two-type models in the literature
on temporary discounts (including Varian (1980) and Sobel (1984)) exten-
sion to a continuum of consumer willingnesses to pay is possible. As in
Varian (1980), as long as enough consumers are not adept at moving all
of their purchases into sale periods, intertemporal variation in prices will
enhance the retailer's ability to price discriminate.
Our model also abstracts from competition among multiple stores. Ob-
viously, a model with perfect competition would limit the opportunity to
price discriminate. However, an extension of our model along the lines of
Lal and Matutes (1994) should preserve the basic insights of our model. Lal
and Matutes (1994) model multiproduct retailers with travel costs between
stores. The ability of consumers to shop both stores, at a cost, disciplines
the overall rents across products that stores can extract from each consumer.
However, the ability to extract dierent levels of rents from dierent con-
sumer types and from dierent products is preserved. Ellison (2005), in a
dierent context, provides an extension of Lal and Matutes in which price
discrimination across consumer types emerges in an equilibrium with spa-
tial competition. The easiest way to understand the eects of introducing
competition into our model is to view competition as impacting consumer
15willingness to pay. Spatial competition opens additional scope for price
discrimination as retailers may benet from price discriminating between
consumers who will and won't travel to obtain a price discount.
While our model is stylized, it provides a useful framing for our analysis.
Below, we will show empirically that the prices paid in our data resemble
a weighted average of a xed weight index and the \best price", as in (6).
We use these insights to speculate about pricing implications in more com-
plicated environments than those described by the model and we provide a
preliminary discussion of approaches to measuring and characterizing prices
in such environments.
Summing up, the model comfortably explains the familiar price pattern
observed for individual goods of a regular price with intermittent sale prices.
In addition, it makes the following testable predictions. First, sales across
items should be staggered. Second, demand will be more stable for bundles
of close substitutes across several weeks (that include at least one sale) than
for individual weeks or for individual items over that same period. Third,
the actual price paid will be much lower than a regular or normal price if
bargain hunters are important. Fourth, prices paid should generally be a
combination of a conventional xed weight price index and the best available
price within the group of close substitutes over the course of several weeks.
Finally, it is possible that the frequency of sales (or the size of discounts) will
be a meaningful margin of adjustment in a pricing strategy. More generally,
the updating rules that consumers use in revising their reservation prices
will play a critical role in determining prices.
3 The Data
Given our interest in examining both the incidence of sales and consumer
responses to them, our project requires a data set that contains both prices
and quantities. This eliminates many data sets, most notably those from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics that have been the source for many of the
most important recent papers on price setting patterns. We instead we rely
on two scanner data sets (from Dominick's and IRI Symphony) that include
quantity information.
The data for two of the categories we analyze are taken from Dominick's
Finer Foods (DFF). DFF is a leading supermarket chain in the Chicago
metropolitan area; they have approximately 90 stores and a market share of
approximately 20%. Dominick's provided the University of Chicago Booth
School of Business with weekly store-level scanner data by universal product
16code (UPC) including: unit sales, retail price, cents of prot per dollar sold,
and a deal code indicating shelf-tag price reductions (bonus buys) or in-store
coupon. The DFF relationship began in 1989 (with week 1) and our dataset
ends in 1997 (with week 399).5 To explore the predictions of the model
we focus on data for frozen concentrated orange juice (frozen OJ in what
follows) and oatmeal products.
DFF has four types of stores that vary in the average level of prices.
These average price dierences are based on the wealth of the surrounding
neighborhoods and the amount of local competition. For the results below,
we focus on a single store, although we have prepared robustness checks for
groups of stores in all of the price tiers. The store we use is located in the
northwest part of the city of Chicago (near the boundary with Skokie) and
has prices that are in the medium Dominick's pricing tier.
We also use data from a dierent time period and location using Sym-
phony IRI's \IRI Marketing Data Set" (Bronnenberg, Kruger and Mela
(2008)). This dataset allows us to study pricing at other stores outside
Chicago from a more recent period. The IRI dataset contains information
on retailers in 47 market areas for the period 2001 to 2007. For our bench-
mark calculations, we use data from \Chain 35" which has more than 100
stores in the southeastern United States. As part of its eorts to preserve
the anonymity of chains, IRI assigns dierent chain numbers to the regional
divisions of large retailers. Thus, Chain 35 may or may not have more stores
in other regions.
For the IRI dataset, we focus on creamy peanut butter. Stores within
chain 35 appear to charge widely varying prices in the peanut butter cate-
gory. We chose a store in Charlotte NC, store 250517, with medium prices
and no missing data for the rst 313 weeks.6
Below, for robustness, we also examine results for peanut butter for eight
other cities. We select the city randomly, choosing one from each of the eight
Census Regions. In each city, we examine the largest chain. We discard
chains where regional brands dominate the national brands that dominate
in Charlotte. Throughout the paper, we discuss the extent to which the
5There are some missing data. For weeks 219, 232{233, 266{269, 282{283, 358{361,
370{71, 388, and 394 all categories are missing; the particular store we use had data
missing for weeks 33 to 36 and 50; most stores have incomplete information in some
weeks. In addition for frozen concentrated orange juice week 148 is missing and oatmeal
is missing weeks 1{90 and week 151. More information about the Dominick's database is
available at Kilts Marketing Center homepage at the Chicago Booth School of Business.
6Peter Pan prices are missing for all stores between the week of February 12 2007 and
August 13 2007.
17Charlotte store is representative of our ndings for other stores throughout
the country.
In choosing the categories to analyze, we traded o several consider-
ations. The model highlights the importance of accounting for potential
substitution among dierent goods within a category. This leads us to cate-
gories where it is possible to identify sets of goods that were close substitutes
for each other. Substitutability is easier to determine for relatively simple
items with only one or two dominant characteristics. For instance, frozen
OJ is all pretty similar, so that the primary choice we had to make was to
exclude other juices (e.g. tangerine) that Dominick's includes in its frozen
juice category. Hence, by focusing on the 6 top selling brands of frozen
concentrate we capture over 80 percent of market share in the category.
The three simple categories we identied also have the advantage of each
featuring a single major cost driver; in section IV, we introduce data on
underlying commodity prices for oranges, peanuts, and cereals and measure
the extent to which regular prices and the frequency of sales re
ect changes
in the underlying commodity price.
Focusing on only a few products raises concerns about how the results
generalize. In all such studies, there is a tradeo between comprehensiveness
of categories and the care that can be paid to the details of each category.
For example, Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003) document that in some
categories UPCs are discontinued only to have the same product appear
with a new UPC. Hence, splicing series by hand is the only sure way to
capture all the same sales of these types of similar items. But, the task of
splicing the data to capture UPC changes, as well as grouping UPCs within
brands as described below, requires a substantial investment in learning
about the category and cleaning data. Of course, this could in principle be
done on a large scale, but it is very costly. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
devotes some portion of its eld force to cleaning data to create consistency
across categories in construction the CPI (see, for example, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2011.)
We therefore chose to study three very dierent categories of goods that
are representative of the range of goods found in grocery and drug stores.
Bronnenberg et al (2008) show that the propensity of retailers to use sales
depends primarily on the perishability and stockpilability of a good. Highly
perishable items can rarely be stored, but less perishable items might be
storable depending mostly on the natural frequency that the good would
be used. For example, Bronnenberg et al (2008) note that diapers are not
perishable, but the rate at which they are used and the size of an individual
diaper means that it is not very easy or practical to stockpile them either.
18Conversely, while frozen orange juice is more perishable than diapers, the
serving sizes and typical frequency of use makes it an excellent candidate
for stockpiling.
Bronnenberg et al (2008) classify categories according to whether they
are of high, medium or low regarding perishability and storability. By def-
inition, anything highly perishable cannot be stored, while some items like
diapers cannot be stockpiled for other reasons regardless of perishability.
This suggests focusing on three types of categories: one like oatmeal where
incentives to discount are minimal (due to either perishability or lack of
storability), one like peanut butter with moderate incentives to use sales
because either the purchase cycle or perishability limits the storability, and
one like frozen orange juice which is conducive to frequent discounts because
of high stockpilability.
Another important data convention used through out the analysis is that
we always group UPCs of a single brand for which the prices are perfectly
or nearly perfectly correlated. For example, Minute Maid sells four dierent
types of 12 ounce frozen concentrated orange: regular orange juice, country
style, pulp free and added calcium. The prices of each type move in lock
step, with the cross-correlations between the prices uniformly above 0.98.
The pulp free juice was not available at the start of the sample and appears in
the store we study about 35 weeks into the sample. While for some purposes
one might want to distinguish between regular orange juice and these other
varieties, given the near perfect co-movement in prices (and in particular the
perfectly co-incident sales) it would be practically impossible to estimate an
elasticity of substitution between them since the relative prices do not vary.
Because package sizes need not be the same, we also convert prices to
price per ounce to facilitate comparisons; for orange juice, the house brand
of frozen OJ is sold in both a 12 ounce and six ounce can, while for the
other 4 brands (Minute Maid, Tropicana, Florida Gold, Citrus Hill), the
vast majority of sales derive from 12 ounce cans.
For oatmeal we concentrate on the two sizes of regular Quaker Oats
(18 ounce and 42 ounce packages). They account for roughly 35% of all
hot oatmeal sold. The remainder of the purchases is largely concentrated
amongst instant oatmeal. It was our judgment that the substitutability
across these types of cereal would be low; we will oer some direct evidence
of this below.
For the Charlotte store, we include the 3 top selling national brands of
creamy peanut butter: Jif, Peter Pan and Skippy. Each is sold in an 18 ounce
jar and collectively these three 18oz products account for roughly a quarter
of all peanut butter sales in the Charlotte store, with much of the rest of
19the category being either much dierent jar sizes, or being chunky peanut
butter or peanut butter blends such as peanut and honey. It is important
to note that, when we undertake the robustness checks in other cities, we
use these brands and sizes although 18 oz is not always the top selling size
in those other locations. These cities also vary substantially in the extent to
which private label brands are important.7 While the packages we examine
account for roughly a quarter of all peanut butter sales in Charlotte, they
account for as little as 15 percent of the peanut butter sales in the other
cities.
Representative prices for particular UPCs of frozen OJ and oatmeal are
shown in Figures 5 and 6. The acquisition cost for the item is also included
as a point of reference. We see three salient facts in these two pictures.
First, both of the items show the familiar pattern of regular prices that
change occasionally, mixed together with intermittent sales. Second, the
frequency of sales varies across the categories, in the expected fashion, with
sales being much less common for oatmeal than frozen OJ. This suggests
that these two categories will allow us to explore dierent aspects of the
model's predictions. The frequency of the frozen OJ sales will highlight
the role of high frequency cross-brand willingness to switch, while oatmeal
discounts will only matter if consumers are willing to engage in storage.
Third, DFF seems to be consciously making choices about prices so
that prices do not simply mirror a pass-through of acquisition cost changes.
While we recognize that the acquisition costs data are imperfect measures of
marginal cost, there are times when sales take place with no movements in
acquisition costs and other cases where the regular acquisition cost changes
and the regular price does not. It seems very unlikely that these patterns
are being caused by the problems with the acquisition cost calculations.
Turning to the Charlotte store, prices for 18 ounce Jif creamy peanut
butter are shown in Figure 7. The price pattern is similar to the ones from
the DFF dataset (and to what we nd for most of the other cities in the IRI
sample). Peanut butter is discounted more often than oatmeal but less often
than frozen OJ. Store 250517 sometimes runs sales for two weeks, whereas
most Dominick's sales last only a week.8
These characteristics of the data have been responsible for several of
the debates mentioned in the introduction. In particular, although prices
change frequently, \regular" prices change infrequently. These features of
7See Kashyap (2012) for a discussion of the complications that arise in analyzing cat-
egories in which the market share of private labels is high.
8For Dominick's, the weekly sales circular and sales price cycle coincides with the data
collection week. This is not necessarily true of the stores in the IRI dataset.
20the data are dicult to reconcile with either a standard 
exible price model
or a standard menu cost model. As we discussed above, one solution that
the literature has oered is to simply ignore the sale prices, focusing on the
regular prices. However, as our model suggests, these sale periods are recur-
ring and appear to re
ect some strategy beyond passing through changes in
acquisition costs. Thus, we explore below whether focusing only on changes
in regular prices is appropriate and consider alternative approaches to price
measurement.
To characterize the high frequency price variation apparent in these cat-
egories, we require denitions for \sale prices" and \regular prices". In order
to provide comparability to the literature, we will consider dierent deni-
tions of \regular" and \sale" prices. Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo
(2011), focus on \reference" prices and departures from \reference" prices.
A reference price is dened quite simply as the modal price for an item in
a given quarter. We will examine the behavior of reference prices, as well
as prices below the reference price, and prices above the reference price. As
Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo note, however, while reference prices
may provide a reasonable measure of the \regular" price, a reference price
methodology does not necessarily cleanly identify sale prices. For example,
if the regular price is reduced toward the end of the quarter, so that the new
regular price is not the modal price for the quarter, we would not want to
characterize the new price as a sale price. Thus, while we will examine the
behavior of quantities purchased when prices are at their reference price or
below their reference price, we do not use reference price departures as our
primary measure of sales.
Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) report a dierent sales identication meth-
odology, which we also calculate. Kehoe and Midrigan propose measuring a
sale as a price cut which is reversed within ve weeks. We adopt a similar
denition. However, we note that the data contain very small apparent price
changes; there are cases where the price in a week appears to be less than a
cent or two lower than the price in the previous week. As in most scanner
datasets, the price series is actually constructed by dividing total revenues
by total unit sales. There may be product scanning input errors, situations
in which a consumer uses a cents o coupon, situations with store coupons,
etc, where tiny shifts in measured prices occur but do not re
ect real changes
in posted prices. We thus set a tolerance for a price change|requiring the
price change to be \large" enough to be considered either a sale price or a
change in the regular price. We set this tolerance at $0.002 per ounce.
214 Results
One of the simplest predictions of our model is that retailer-driven sales
should not be coincident for branded close substitutes. Specically, our
model shows that price discrimination between brand-loyal and non-loyal
consumers can be exploited by holding sales on only one branded product.
Figures 8 to 10 show the price series' for the top two selling items in each
of the categories. Simple eyeball tests suggest that the sales are staggered.
We investigate this issue more systematically below.
4.1 The Staggering of Sales
We use a simple methodology to examine the extent to which sales are
staggered. In Table 1, we compare the observed frequency of simultaneous
sales to that which would be expected if the sales of the individual UPCs
were randomly timed. For example, for the three peanut butters that we
study, at any point in time there can be between zero and three of the
UPCs on sale. Using our data, we calculate the share of weeks for which no
product is on sale, a total of one of the products is on sale, a total of two
of the products are on sale and all three of the products are on sale. Using
the unconditional probability of a sale for each of the three products, we
compute the predicted probability that 0, 1, 2, and 3 products would be on
sale if the sale/no sale decision was independent across products. We can
compare the predicted coincidence of sales to the actual coincidence of sales
in the data.
We present these results for the three peanut butter products and for the
two Quaker oatmeal products. For frozen OJ, we present a comparison of
the three branded products and these same three plus the two DFF house
brands; we exclude the Citrus Hill juice that dropped out of the sample
halfway through. For frozen OJ and peanut butter the probability of exactly
one item in the category being on sale is higher than would be predicted
if the sale probabilities were independent. Conversely, the probabilities of
more than one item being on sale are lower than would be predicted under
the assumption of independent sales. 9
For oatmeal, unlike the other two categories, both products are on sale
together three times during the 291 weeks, which is about as frequently as
would be expected under the independence hypothesis. This is the rst of
9Our nding of a high probability of one and only one sale holds true for peanut butter
in the other cities where the three selected brands are the market leaders, but not in the
cities where a private label brand has a dominant position in the market.
22many indications that oatmeal is very dierent from our other two cate-
gories. That is precisely why we selected it for study. Oatmeal is purchased
infrequently and is purchased seasonally. It is also essentially a monopoly
category-there are no brands with any signicant market share competing
with Quaker in our data.
We make two observations from the pattern of oatmeal price discounts.
First, the retailer does not appear to be actively price discriminating among
consumers who are loyal to one size of oatmeal over the other. Second, for
the 31 sales we record over 291 weeks, only one takes place during the months
from April to August. Thus, price discounts for oatmeal are concentrated
during the period when demand is highest. While the retailer does not
appear to be price discriminating across individuals loyal to the two sizes,
the retailer may be engaged in discriminating between consumers who can
wait for sales and consumers who cannot.
A comparison of the three-product orange juice results and the ve-
product orange juice results is interesting. The ve-product results include
the two unbranded products. While sales are generally staggered, it is clear
that overlapping sales are more common in the ve-product universe than
in the three-product universe. Indeed, of the cases where 2 or more of the
juices are on sale, 50% have the Dominick's private label 12 ounce being on
sale, and another 27% involve the private label 6 ounce product. Only in
45% of the cases of multiple items on sale do we see the duplication due
to a coincidence of discounts of branded items.10 Thus, sales are much less
likely to be coincident among the branded goods than for branded and un-
branded goods. This pattern accords with our expectations. The marketing
literature generally nds that branded goods and the unbranded goods are
not seen as close substitutes by many consumers (Blattberg and Wisniewski
(1989)).11 Furthermore, since the \regular" price of the unbranded goods
is low, consumers may not need the inducement of a sale on the unbranded
goods to get the bargain-hunters to purchase. We provide additional infor-
mation on unbranded goods in our analysis of peanut butter pricing in the
penultimate section of the paper.
We conclude that the retailers strategically time sales. We have found
that, in each of our three product categories, for the leading products that
10These percentages need not sum to 1 because we can have cases where the two private
label items are on sale together, etc.
11See also Gicheva, Hastings, and Villas-Boas (2010) for some evidence that the will-
ingness to substitute towards unbranded goods may be time-varying. Although they nd
the propensity to look for sale prices may vary even more than the willingness to switch
to store brands.
23we examine, there is at least one sale in 11% of the weeks for oatmeal, 51%
of the weeks for peanut butter in Charlotte, and 88% of the weeks for frozen
orange juice (70% of the weeks for national brand frozen orange juice). In
seven of the eight comparator cities for peanut butter, there is a sale on at
least one of our three products in over half of the weeks. These observations
suggest a possibility that we will explore below; an alert consumer who is
not loyal to a particular brand and who is willing to store goods for a short
period of time need almost never pay the \regular" or reference price. Next,
we explore the extent to which consumers are and are not, in fact, paying
the \regular" prices.
4.2 Purchase Responses to Sales
Having concluded that sales are strategically timed by the retailer, we next
explore their implications for consumers. Specically, we examine the eect
of sales on prices paid by consumers and quantities purchased. Tables 2
and 3 show, for each of our UPCs, data on percent of weeks during the sam-
ple and the percent of total units sold with discounted prices. Table 2 denes
the sales using our variant of the Kehoe{Midrigan algorithm. Table 3 repeats
the calculations when we use the EJR algorithm to select regular prices and
dene sales prices to be those prices which are below the reference price.
It is unsurprising that quantity sold increases substantially when a prod-
uct experiences a price reduction. However, the combination of frequent,
staggered discounts along with consumers who readily switch brands and
time purchases means that a substantial fraction of all of the units sold are
sold at prices below the \regular" price.12 For the two DFF categories, we
nd that the share of total ounces purchased on sale is approximately three
times the number of product-weeks during which sales were held. Peanut
butter consumers in Charlotte are somewhat less responsive to sales; for the
peanut butter category we nd that the share of total ounces purchased on
sale is approximately twice the number of product-weeks during which sales
were held. Within the peanut butter category, there is some variation across
12The large percentages of transactions that take place at sales prices are not surprising.
Kehoe and Midrigan mention this observation as one of their observations about the
Dominick's data. Bronnenberg, Kruger and Mela (2008)'s IRI data set covers 30 categories
of goods at over 100 grocery chains in 50 dierent geographical markets. Their Table 2
shows the fraction of products that are sold on any deal and the mean percentage is 36.8%;
more than 30% are sold on deal in 25 of the 30 categories they study. Grith et al. (2009)
also nd that about 29.5 percent of total food expenditure from a large sample of British
households is on sale items. Hence, the ndings for our three categories are very typical
of what happens in grocery stores.
24our eight comparator cities in the measured overall responsiveness to sales.
The lowest responsiveness is Knoxville, where the share of ounces sold on
sale is 23 percent greater than the share of product-weeks with sales. The
greatest responsiveness is our data from Hartford, where, over our seven
year sample, only 7 percent of product-weeks have sales, but 57 percent of
the total ounces sold are purchased at a sale price.
But there is some interesting heterogeneity in the fraction of weeks on
sale and the responses. First, the six ounce store brand of orange juice
goes on sale infrequently relative to the other juices|about ten percent of
total weeks, yet it still garners sixty ve percent of its sales in those weeks.
Loosely speaking it appears that shoppers mostly prefer the larger package
sizes and are quite willing to shift towards the smaller house brand when it
is being discounted.13
Second, we chose to examine oatmeal because we expect it to be dis-
counted less frequently than frozen OJ. That is what we nd. Interestingly,
we do see evidence of substantial hoarding in sales of the 18 ounce package,
with quantities purchased more than tripling when it is put on discount. The
purchase response by buyers of the large oatmeal packages to a discount is
less pronounced. This contrast also seems reasonable given the diculty in
storing the larger package; notice also that the average price per ounce of the
large package is about 25 percent cheaper than the smaller package. From
Figure 9 we can see that early in the sample there are some cases where
even when the smaller package is on sale, it is not cheaper on a per ounce
basis than the larger package; see Grith et al. (2009) for additional more
direct evidence of the heterogeneity in households willingness to buy in bulk
to save money. The percentage declines in the price when the large package
is discounted are not as great as for discounts on the smaller package.
The peanut butter data illustrate that the pattern of sales and regu-
lar prices can dier signicantly across brands. For the Charlotte store,
discounts are more frequent for Peter Pan (22 percent of weeks) versus Jif
(14.4 percent of weeks). Unsurprisingly, then, a large fraction of the units
of Peter Pan peanut butter are sold on sale. This raises an important fact;
ignoring sales in examining pricing behavior can distort inferences not only
across categories, but even across brands within the category.
Finally, notice that using our variant of the Kehoe and Midrigan algo-
13The 6oz juice discounts are concentrated in the latter half of the sample. Dominick's
appeared not to use the 6oz product as a promotional vehicle during the rst half. Around
this time, Dominick's was very enthusiastic about running \fty cent" sales promotions in
which all of the items featured prominently in their sales circular were on special for fty
cents. The sale price of the 6oz juice appears to t in with the fty cent sale strategy.
25rithm, we nd fewer sales, in general, than when using the Eichenbaum,
Jaimovich, and Rebelo reference price methodology. This stems mechani-
cally from the fact that the methodology in EJR is not designed to measure
\regular" price changes within the quarter. For example, if a price is re-
duced two weeks before the end of the quarter, and the new price continues
throughout the next quarter, our methodology codes that change as a shift
in the regular price, not a sale. For EJR, that same price sequence is coded
as a price that deviates from the reference price for two weeks, and equals
a new reference price at the beginning of the next quarter.
4.3 Best Prices
To quantify the impact of strategic shopping on prices paid and facilitate
comparisons of results with previous studies, we convert the weekly data
into quarterly data. We calculate two useful measures of pricing. First, we
calculate the \price paid" by aggregating purchases over the quarter and
using transactions as the weighting mechanism, rather than time. That is,
we calculate the average price actually paid by consumers for for every ounce
purchased during the quarter.
One way to gauge the importance of bargain hunting is to compare
the actual price paid to the best possible price that could be obtained by
a consumer who is willing to undertake storage and views all brands as
perfect substitutes. To compute the \best" price, we consider a hypothetical
shopper in a product category who concentrates all purchases over a certain
interval into whichever good is cheapest. The best price re
ects the limiting
case in our model, the case where every shopper is a bargain hunter and has
no deterioration in demand from waiting across periods to buy.
We are forced to make an assumption about the horizon over which
bargain hunters can be expected to hunt for sales and stockpile. We use the
information about how frequently sales are held to infer this. Empirically,
we know that some discount occurs in roughly 88% of the weeks for frozen
OJ, about half of the weeks for peanut butter in our Charlotte store and
about 11% of the weeks for oatmeal. Thus, we posit that the purchasing
horizon is shortest for frozen OJ and longest for oatmeal. For frozen OJ we
assume that optimization occurs over 3 week intervals and that the shoppers
have perfect foresight about coming sales. So, for each week we compute
the \best price" as equal to the lowest price (per ounce) in the category
that week, the week before and the week after. Thus, we construct a best
price over a three week window for every week. The average best price for
the quarter is the average of the 13 weekly best prices. For oatmeal the
26storability leads us to allow for a 7 week window so that the hypothetical
shopper is scanning three weeks forwards and backwards at each week. We
use a 5 week window for peanut butter, re
ecting the fact that sales for
peanut butter are more common than oatmeal but not as frequent as for
orange juice. For each category, for the horizon chosen, a consumer can
almost always nd a sale if s/he is willing to search weekly over the horizon.
We compare the actual price paid to the \best price" series as well as
the two xed weight price series discussed above. One is the xed weight
average of the reference price for each constituent UPC and the other is the
xed weight average of the list prices. The xed weights are all computed
based on the constituent product's share of total ounces over the rst quarter
of our sample. The quarterly prices to which the xed weights are applied
are constructed by equal weighting the weekly prices for the UPCs in the
quarter.
Figure 11 shows the resulting series for frozen OJ. The actual price paid
tracks the best price remarkably well; the correlation is 0.92. Recall that in
the model, if there were a constant fraction of shoppers who were loyal to
one brand, then these people's prices paid would track the list prices for that
brand. If there were groups loyal to each brand plus bargain hunters, the
average price paid of the loyals would equal a standard xed weight index
and the average price paid of the bargain hunters would equal the \best"
price. In this case, the inactive shoppers would lead the average price paid
to be a relatively constant amount above the best price. This description
seems to describe well Figure 11.
Figure 12 shows the analogous data for oatmeal. As we saw in Figure
11, sales are much less common for oatmeal than the other two categories,
yet the price paid still closely tracks the best price; the correlation is 0.95.
This tracking indicates that shoppers are timing their purchases to take
considerable advantage of the sales when they do occur.
Figure 13 shows the four series for creamy peanut butter in Charlotte.
Once again the price paid mirrors the best price; the correlation is 0.81. In
this case the gap between the average list price and the price paid is lower
than in the other two categories. This is because there are a substantial
number of consumers who choose Jif despite the fact that Peter Pan is almost
always cheaper. This accounts for the earlier nding that fraction of units
bought on sale is only twice the fraction of weeks where sales occur in the
peanut butter category in Charlotte. In the two categories at Dominick's, we
nd that purchases are more responsiveness to discounts. Turning to peanut
butter in the other cities, our data suggest that the correlation between price
paid and best price ranges from a low of 0.63 in Knoxville to a high of 0.93
27in Houston and averages 0.82.
Recall from Table 1 that sales happen about 88% of the weeks for frozen
OJ, about half the time for creamy peanut butter in Charlotte, and only
about 11% of the time for oatmeal. Yet, price paid is strongly correlated
with best price for all three categories. For frozen OJ and creamy peanut
butter, the tracking indicates either a willingness to actively switch across
brands every week or to hoard substantially every few weeks when the pre-
ferred brand comes up for a sale. For oatmeal the only explanation for
the tight association is inter-temporal storage, whereby people bulk up pur-
chases during the sale periods.
4.4 Demand Variability
Our model posits that the high percentages of purchases on sale re
ect
strategic cross-product and cross-time substitution by bargain hunters. If
so, then the quantities sold for an individual product and the quantities
sold in a given week will 
uctuate as consumers substitute across time and
across products. However, this does not imply that demand is volatile, nor
that consumption is volatile. Thus, we expect that the total quantity pur-
chased within the product category will be more stable than the purchases
of individual UPCs. Furthermore, if consumption is unaected by sales and
consumers are merely stockpiling, then the surge in quantities purchased
associated with a price discount will largely be \borrowed" from adjacent
weeks. We explore these predictions in Table 4.
If the demand for the goods in the category were independent, then the
variance of the sum of the whole category's ounces sold would equal the
sum of the variances of the individual products. If the demand for goods in
the category were instead hit by signicant common demand shocks, then
the variance of the sum of the category's ounces would exceed the sum
of the variances of the individual products. Finally, if there is a negative
correlation in demand across the products due to price discounts and cross-
product substitution, the variance of total sales will be lower than for the
individual items. Of course, the data in the table only show the net of
these eects|it is possible that there are both positively correlated demand
shocks and negative correlation induced by substitution for the same set of
goods.
Table 4 shows the weekly variance of ounces sold for each UPC. It also
shows the weekly variance of total ounces sold in the 2-good oatmeal group,
the 6-good orange juice group, and the 3-good peanut butter group. Table 4
shows that frozen OJ sales from week to week are about half as volatile as
28the sum of the variance of the individual UPCs. Similarly, the total weekly
creamy peanut butter is about 20 percent less volatile than predicted based
on the 
uctuations of the three underlying brands. These results are robust
for peanut butter for the eight other cities that we examined (total category
sales volatility ranges from 26 percent to 4 percent below what would be
predicted based on the volatility of the individual products). In contrast,
for oatmeal there is no dierence between the variance of weekly sales and
the sum of the variances of the two dierent sized packages.
The results suggest that, for orange juice and peanut butter, negative
correlation in the purchases of individual products (presumably due to sales)
is important and is not oset by large correlated demand shocks. For oat-
meal, this appears not to be true. This is unsurprising for two reasons.
First, sales are infrequent in oatmeal|the number of weeks in which there
is a surge in demand for one product and a decline in demand for the other
due to the sale is small relative to the total number of weeks. Second, there
is a substantial osetting factor that works in the opposite direction. De-
mand for oatmeal is seasonal; there are substantially more sales|of both
package sizes|in the winter than in the summer. That means that the two
products face positively correlated demand shocks; this would tend to lead
the variance of the sum of all product sales to be greater than the sum of
the variances.
We conclude that the variability in quantity sold from week to week or
for an individual UPC paints a misleading picture of the inherent volatility
of demand. Once we account for retailer-induced substitution across time
and brands, a signicant fraction of the variance disappears, as predicted
by the model. This provides an important caveat for anyone engaged in the
exercise of calibrating a pricing model using data for each UPC in isolation.
In particular, by examining each UPC in isolation, one would be tempted to
conclude that a product is experiencing signicant variation in demand for
which the retailer is not responding by changing prices. Using these data to
calibrate a menu cost model, one would diagnose signicant menu costs in
order to t the observation of signicant demand 
uctuations unanswered
by a price response.
4.5 Time-varying impact of sales
Our model and simulation in Figure 4 suggest that retailers may adjust the
frequency of sales in response to shifts in the share of consumers who are
brand loyal or in response to cost shocks. Furthermore, if macroeconomic
factors lead to shifts in share of consumers who are \shoppers", even a xed
29discount strategy will have varying eects over the cycle. Testing these
hypotheses directly is challenging in our setting because we do not have
direct observation on most of the key driving factors in the model, namely
reservation prices, the shares of bargain hunters, or the deterioration in
bargain hunter demand. So we pursue a more modest goal. In this section,
we examine quarterly data for our products, and we examine the extent to
which both the regular price and the frequency of sales responds to cost
shocks.
It is rst useful to note that, while our data show fairly \sticky" regular
prices, the actual price paid by consumers can nonetheless vary substantially.
For example, for peanut butter in Charlotte, we have two long periods with
no changes in the regular price of any of our products. Specically, the
average Kehoe-Midrigan base price is constant for the rst four quarters of
the sample, and then is constant again (at a lower level) for four quarters (10
to 13). During the rst ve quarters, the average quarterly price paid ranges
from 4.3% below the base price to 18.1% below the base price. During the
second long stretch, the quarterly price paid ranges from 4.7% below the
regular price to 13.1% below the regular price. Thus, while the regular price
is constant, the eective price paid varies substantially.
We further investigate these issues by examining the relationship be-
tween the regular price (dened using the Kehoe-Midrigan base price), the
frequency of sales, and the world commodity price of the underlying com-
modity being sold. For peanut butter, we examine the IMF's world peanut
price; for orange juice, we examine the IMF's world orange price; for oat-
meal we examine the IMF's world cereals price index. The IMF prices are
all in metric tons. We convert them to ounces, and for oranges, we adjust for
the production relationship between oranges and frozen concentrated orange
juice. To give a sense of magnitudes, in our data, the mean price paid by
consumers for packaged peanut butter is approximately 11 cents per ounce;
the commodity nut price is about 2.4 cents per ounce.
For each product (and in each of the IRI cities), we conduct three very
simple regressions to measure the relationship between our observed market
data and the underlying commodity price. First, we regress the quarterly
average KM base price on the commodity price. Nearly any theory of price
adjustment would predict that the regular price of the product would co-
vary positively with the underlying commodity price. We would expect the
coecients in this regression to be between zero and one for orange juice
and peanut butter (for oats, since we have a cereals index, rather than the
30oat price specically, the levels are not interpretable).14
Next, we measure the share of total weeks in the quarter in which a
sale takes place for some product in the category; this is the frequency of
sales. We regress the share of weeks in the quarter that have a sale on the
commodity price. Our model predicts that the retailer will hold a sale more
frequently when costs are lower and less frequently when costs are higher.
In our model, adjusting the frequency of sales can be used as a substitute for
altering the base price (specically, in situations in which the cost changes
but consumer reservation values do not).
Finally, we regress the price paid by consumers on the commodity price.
Again, in our model, the price paid (which incorporates both the base price
and sales including consumer responsiveness to sales) should be responsive
to the underlying costs. Again, for orange juice and peanut butter, we would
expect coecients between zero and one.
The results are presented in Table 5. The rst column of Table 5 shows
the regressions of the base or regular price on the world commodity price.
Coecients would, of course, be expected to be positive. They are in nine
of the eleven cases. In six of the cases where the relationship has the correct
sign, it is statistically dierent from zero at least at the ten percent con-
dence level. Coecient estimates vary signicantly. The coecients for
peanut butter in New York and Chicago are \too big", as they exceed one.
The second column of Table 5 shows the regressions of the share of weeks
with a sale in the category regressed against the commodity price. Our hy-
pothesis is that, if sales are used as an adjustment margin, sales should be
less frequent when commodity prices are high, leading to a negative coe-
cient for the commodity price. This is true for nine of the eleven cases. One
of the two exceptions is oats; as we have discussed earlier, oatmeal price
reductions appear to have a strong seasonal component. The winter price
reductions in oatmeal overwhelm any price changes related to commodity
price movements. An alternative unreported specication that includes a
winter quarter dummy for oats shows the predicted (albeit insignicant) co-
ecient for the cereals price once controlling for the winter quarter dummy.
The results are signicant at conventional condence levels in two of the
cases.
The third column of Table 5 shows the regressions of actual price paid by
consumers on the commodity price. This price will incorporate changes in
14Of course, peanuts and oranges are not the only inputs into peanut butter and orange
juice{ there is packaging, labor, etc. If the prices of those other inputs are systematically
positively or negatively correlated with the key commodity input, then the prediction of
coecients between zero and one would not hold.
31the base price, changes in discounts, and consumer responsiveness to those
discounts. We have argued before that this object really should be the object
of interest for macroeconomists rather than the base price in situations in
which retailers use sales strategically. Here, all of the specications have
the predicted sign, and in contrast to the regressions using the base price,
all of the coecients for the commodity price are bounded by zero and
one. Houston and St. Louis are both interesting cases here; for these cities,
the base price appears negatively correlated with the underlying commodity
price; using price paid yields results more in line with price adjustment.
This analysis is quite simple and limited by the data availability; how-
ever, our analysis suggests that sales may be an important strategic tool for
the retailer. Furthermore, incorporating sales to determine the price paid
does generate realistic responsiveness to underlying commodity prices in a
way that the base price does not. We think it is irresponsible to rule out
a priori the hypothesis that the frequency and depth of sales can play a
role in monetary transmission. Indeed, our model and evidence conform
closely with the nding in Klenow and Willis (2007) that sale prices are
as responsive to shocks as regular prices. It also conforms with the nding
in Gicheva, Hastings, and Villas-Boas (2010) that consumers become much
more responsive to grocery store promotions when gasoline prices are high.
5 Model Fit and Price Measurement Proposal
The recent debate in macroeconomics has sometimes been framed as a de-
bate between a \keeping sales in" versus \taking sales out" approach to
price series construction. We have shown that even episodic sales for a few
items can reduce the average price paid in a product category in a calen-
dar quarter by twenty to thirty percent. Thus, we suggest that sales are
important. Furthermore, our model and empirical results highlight the im-
portance of the multiproduct nature of the retailer's price-setting decision
and its inter-temporal nature. We would argue that, for a multiproduct re-
tailer like a grocery store, the price series for a single UPC is simply not an
object that should be of any interest to macroeconomists. Like the retailer,
the economist has to be concerned with the pricing plan over time and over
close substitute products.
When considering close substitute products, we have repeatedly referred
to the average price paid or variable weight index as the relevant construct
for a product category. For a narrow product category, changes in this index
re
ect changes in the prices that consumers pay per unit for a fairly homo-
32geneous product. This presents a conundrum, however, because variable
weight price index has two important downsides for price index construc-
tion. First, one has to be quite cautious about identifying an appropriate
set of close substitutes.15 If two few substitutes are included then the cate-
gory will exhibit spurious volatility when the omitted good goes on sale. In
this case, the average price paid will also be too high since it will miss the
substitution into the discounted product. Alternatively if too many items
are thrown into a category, the degree of substitution will appear low and
average prices paid could become less informative. For example, grouping
orange and apple juices together would likely lead to a much noisier prices
paid series than if both categories were properly modeled.
Secondly, and crucially, however, the high frequency quantity data nec-
essary to construct a variable weight price index is frequently unavailable.
In contrast, construction of neither the \reference" price series nor the xed
weight average price series requires high frequency data on quantities. (At
some point, some quantity data has to be collected to construct weights,
but that data collection can be infrequent.) Thus, for example, the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) employs the xed expenditure share geometric
mean index within item strata. An important feature of this index is that
it requires no quantity data.
Fortunately, our model and empirical results suggest an alternative meth-
odology. Note that our model, in Equation (7) provides a very tractable
formulation for estimating a price series without high frequency data on
quantities. In (7), we show that the variable weight index or price paid is
approximated by a weighted average of the xed weight price index and the
\best price" over the k-period sales cycle. Note that the best price is simply
the lowest price (per ounce) of any product in the product category over
some number of weeks. Finding the \best price" does not require quantity
data.
Thus, an approximation for the price paid (variable weight index) can
be constructed that takes a xed weight average of the \best price" and the
normal xed weight price index. All that remains then is to nd the weights.
The weights are the share of \loyals" in the marketplace and the share of
non-loyals in the marketplace.16 Of course, one would like to have some kind
of data to estimate these shares and ultimately, to estimate those shares one
needs some kind of quantity data. We posit that assuming any share of
15See Nevo and Hatzitaskos (2005) for additional discussion of this issue.
16Note that, in our model, we assumed that the share of the loyals attached to each
of the two brands is equal. That assumption is not necessary and plays no role in the
analysis of this section.
33loyals between 0 and 1 will produce a price series that is more informative
than a price series constructed just using the regular price (which actually
implies a share of loyals greater than one). However, even with limited
quantity data one could produce weights for the best price and the xed
weight index. One might be willing to assume that the loyal share is the
same across product categories within a store, or the same across stores
within a city. More research needs to be done on this point. For now, we
conclude by approximating the weights for the xed price index and the best
price index in our sample, where we actually have quantity data and thus
the variable weight price index.
For each of our three product categories, we conduct a simple regression
of the variable weight price index (\price paid") on the xed weight index
and the \best price" series with no constant. Note that if (7) is a good
approximation for our data, the weights on the two price series should add
up to one and the constant will be zero. Note also that these conditions are
not hard-wired to hold. Consumer preferences and therefore market shares
could drift away from the xed weights of the xed weight indices; some
demand model could hold where best price is not particularly relevant.
Results are shown in Table 6 for each of the three product groups. Table 6
also shows the p value for a test of the hypothesis that the coecients for the
xed weight index and best price sum to one and also shows the p value of a
test of the joint hypothesis that the constant equals zero and the best price
coecients sum to one. In all cases, the estimated value of the constant term
is not signicantly dierent from zero at standard condence levels. We also
cannot reject that the coecients for best price and average list price sum
to one. (For orange juice, however, we do reject the joint hypothesis of
both the constant equalling zero and the coecients summing to one). The
coecient estimates are themselves informative. For oatmeal and frozen OJ,
the data prefer approximately a 60% weight on the best price and a 40%
weight on the xed weight index. For the peanut butter at the Charlotte
store, the data choose approximately equal weights on the best price index
and the xed weight index. For that product and store, the data suggest
that more consumers are brand-loyal. This is consistent with our ndings
above that the impact of sales is smaller for peanut butter at the Charlotte
store than for either of the products at DFF.
We also examine our results for peanut butter in the additional cities. For
seven of the eight cities, we cannot reject that the sum of the coecients for
average list price and for best price sum to one. The coecient for best price
range from a low of 0.129 in Knoxville to 0.973 in New York. In New York,
puzzlingly, the coecient for average list price is actually negative, although
34insignicantly dierent from zero. The hypothesis that the constant term
equals zero cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level in any of the cities.
However, the joint hypothesis, that the price coecients sum to one and
that the constant is zero is rejected at the 5 percent level in St. Louis,
Chicago, and Houston (and Charlotte, as previously noted). These results
suggest that our model ts reasonable well across a variety of settings, but
also reveals interesting variation across cities to be explored. Dierences
across cities may or may not, for example, be correlated across dierent
categories of products. Rich scanner datasets such as the IRI dataset will
allow expansive exploration of this issue.
These ndings may bear on the large literature debating how best to
construct consumer price indices. Grith et al. (2009) have a helpful de-
scription of the many ways in which substitution (across brands or over time)
can thwart the construction of cost of living measures. Readers familiar with
government price index construction methodologies may be interested in the
question of how our methodology compares to the BLS's methodology. The
BLS constructs a xed expenditure share geometric mean index within item
strata. This methodology does allow for a limited amount of cross-item
substitution. However, this substitution diers substantially from what we
propose here. The BLS methodology eectively assumes a cross-price elas-
ticity of demand of -1 between items within the strata (with a strata corre-
sponding to a category like peanut butter, oatmeal, or frozen orange juice).
Our analysis thus far has focused on more aggressive item substitution for a
subset of consumers. Our analysis also falls outside usual cross price elastic-
ity frameworks in that our measures emphasize ordinal rather than cardinal
price relationships.
We evaluate the relationship between our methodology and the BLS's
methodology in Table 8. Specically, in Table 8, we demonstrate the results
of the following experiment: we consider whether, if a BLS-type geometric
mean index is used in place of the xed weight index, does the Best Price
still have signicant explanatory power for the average price paid? That
is, we regress average price paid on the geometric index and our best price
measure. In all cases, the best price measure still has signicant explanatory
power for the average price paid. Indeed, the coecients for best price when
using the geometric weight index in the regression are nearly identical to the
coecients for best price when using the xed weight index in the regression.
We obtain similar results for peanut butter in the eight supplemental IRI
cities that we examined in Table 7; regression results using the geometric
mean index are very similar to those show in Table 7 using the xed weight
index.
35We note that our analysis potentially has implications for the measure-
ment of in
ation. As discussed above, the ratio of any list price measure
to the best price is by no means constant, even at the quarterly frequency.
Thus, using list price measures in calculating in
ation misses time or loca-
tion varying discounts that are economically important in magnitude.
6 Conclusion
We provide a simple model of consumer heterogeneity and show how that
heterogeneity motivates temporary price discounts by retailers. The sim-
ulated price path for this model looks remarkably like the empirical path
of prices observed for many retailers. Margins that vary dramatically over
time|even when consumer preferences are stable|are a natural outcome of
our model. Because some consumers are strategic in seeking out sales, the
share of all goods in our sample that are sold at sale prices is two to three
times as large as the number of product-weeks in which sales occur. For the
goods we study, the eective price paid falls far below the posted prices and
indeed, closely tracks the \best price"|a price which is calculated simply as
the minimum price for any good in the set of close substitutes over a short
interval.
We further show that measuring quantities sold for a single UPC will er-
roneously lead to the impression that underlying demand is volatile. Indeed,
much of that volatility derives from the deliberate price-setting behavior of
the retailer for other products in the category. We note that the extent to
which the price paid diers from the regular price varies substantially from
quarter to quarter|focusing on the \regular" price masks considerable dif-
ferences across quarters. Lastly, we show that our model can be exploited
as a structural model of prices paid. We show that, even without high fre-
quency quantity data, a variable weight index can be approximated using
the \best price" concept.
Clearly, the importance of strategic consumer responses to temporary
sales is of paramount importance in some sectors, and of more limited im-
portance in others. However, as Varian notes in his 1999 Handbook of
Industrial Organization survey of price discrimination, sellers almost always
want to engage in price discrimination and price discrimination schemes
involve substantial computational costs. Both the consolidation of the re-
tailing sector over the last decades and the rapid decline in IT costs suggest
that data-driven price discrimination schemes are likely to become more,
rather than less important in the future. Thus, if macroeconomists are to
36successfully model price-setting, confronting price discrimination appears to
be an inevitable challenge.
A nal open issue is how to account for nominal price stickiness. The
framework we have pursued ties price determination to consumers reserva-
tion values for dierent goods. These reservation values should be in terms
of real prices, not nominal ones. But the data suggests that nominal prices
are in fact rigid. There are many reasons why consumers who are routinely
making nominal purchases (especially in low and moderate in
ation envi-
ronments) might confuse real and nominal prices. But this topic deserves
a much fuller treatment and would naturally bring many considerations
about consumer decision-making into the analysis. Given the limited suc-
cess of pure menu cost models of price setting in explaining the kinds of
facts we have documented, and the fact that these theories implicitly have
focused on rms diculties in adjusting prices, this alternative direction
seems promising.
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Figure 1: The time between sales as a function of the valuation of bargain
hunters. Note: V H = 4,  = 0:4,  = 0:9, c = 1









Figure 2: The time between sales as a function of marginal cost. Note:
V H = 4, V L = 2 , = 0:4,  = 0:9








Figure 3: The time between sales as a function of the share of loyals (non-
bargain hunters). Note: V H = 4, V L = 2,  = 0:9, c = 1
Figure 4: Simulated Price from Quarterly Changes in Demand and Cost.
Note: Simulation shows initial values of V H = 4, V L = 2,  = 0:9, c = 1,
 = 0:4. Then, demonstrates the eect of demand and cost shocks. Week
13: Cost shock from 1 to 1.5. Week 26: V L increases from 2 to 3. Week 39:
V H increases from 4 to 5. Week 52:  increases from 0.4 to 0.6.
42Figure 5: Minute Maid 12 ounce Frozen OJ Price and Acquisition Cost



















































Figure 7: Jif 18 ounce jar of Creamy Peanut Butter, Chain 35
Figure 8: Prices for Two Top Selling Frozen Orange Juices























































Weekly Price, Creamy Peanut Butter
Figure 10: Prices for Three Top Peanut Butters, Charlotte
45Figure 11: Quarterly Frozen OJ Reference Prices, Average List Prices, Ef-
fective Prices Paid, and Best Prices.
Figure 12: Quarterly Oatmeal Reference Prices, Average List Prices, Actual
Price Paid, and \Best" Prices
46Figure 13: Quarterly Peanut Butter Reference Prices, Average List Price,
Actual Prices Paid and \Best" Prices
47Table 1: Actual and Expected Distribution of Sales








Note: Contains the 5 frozen OJ products that we examine that
are in the data sample for the entire time period. Unconditional
probabilities of a sale are Minute Maid 12 ounce = 0:295, Tropi-
cana 12 ounce = 0:322, Florida Gold 12 ounce = 0:255, Dominick's
(Heritage House) 12 ounce = 0:311, Dominick's (Heritage House)
6 ounce = 0:106











Note: Unconditional probabilities of a sale for 18 ounce is 0.079
and for 42 ounce is 0.038





Note: Unconditional probabilities of a sale are Jif= 0:151, Peter
Pan= 0:223, Skippy= 0:178Table 2: Ounces Sold and Weeks at Various Prices
Ounces sold Weeks
Frozen OJ Regular price Sale price Regular price Sale price
Minute Maid 12 31.68% 68.32% 70.48% 29.52%
Tropicana 12 22.06% 77.94% 67.82% 32.18%
Dominick's 12 30.06% 69.94% 68.88% 31.12%
Citrus Hill 12 24.43% 75.57% 79.66% 20.34%
Florida Gold 12 17.98% 82.02% 74.47% 25.53%
Dominick's 6 35.02% 64.98% 89.36% 10.64%
TOTAL 27.09% 72.91% 74.67% 25.33%
Oatmeal
Regular price Sale price Regular price Sale price
Quaker 18 70.05% 29.95% 92.10% 7.90%
Quaker 42 91.58% 8.42% 96.22% 3.78%
TOTAL 80.56% 19.44% 94.16% 5.84%
Peanut butter
Regular price Sale price Regular price Sale price
Jif 18 73.31% 26.69% 85.75% 14.25%
Peter Pan 18 60.92% 39.08% 78.11% 21.89%
Skippy 18 56.45% 43.55% 81.89% 18.11%
TOTAL 66.72% 33.28% 82.02% 17.98%

















Minute Maid 12 25.34% 72.57% 2.09% 57.18% 38.83% 3.99%
Tropicana 12 23.21% 74.28% 2.51% 57.87% 37.60% 4.53%
Dominick's 12 26.24% 70.11% 3.65% 55.73% 36.27% 8.00%
Citrus Hill 12 21.67% 76.27% 2.05% 62.32% 31.31% 6.03%
Florida Gold 12 15.11% 83.41% 1.48% 61.17% 31.91% 6.91%
Dominick's 6 28.22% 68.61% 3.16% 77.63% 15.90% 6.47%
TOTAL 23.88% 73.48% 2.64% 62.54% 31.41% 6.05%
Oatmeal
Quaker 18 63.86% 33.30% 2.85% 84.88% 10.65% 4.47%
Quaker 42 86.34% 7.83% 2.91% 93.47% 3.44% 3.09%
TOTAL 76.26% 20.86% 2.88% 89.18% 7.04% 3.78%
Peanut Butter
Jif 18oz 66.89% 31.58% 1.53% 78.36% 20.00% 1.64%
Peter Pan 18 oz 56.68% 43.32% 0.00% 73.37% 26.63% 0.00%
Skippy 18 oz 48.03% 51.08% 0.89% 76.32% 21.73% 1.95%
TOTAL 61.03% 38.13% 0.84% 76.08% 22.69% 1.22%
Reference Price is exactly at EJR Reference Price; sales dened as in EJR




Minute Maid 12 10,846,714
Tropicana 12 18,696,622
Dominick's 12 20,655,582
Citrus Hill 12 5,730,370
Florida Gold 12 5,070,080
Dominick's 6 2,173,754
Sum of UPC Variances 63,173,120
Weekly Category Variance 33,835,204




Sum of UPC Variances 5,996,331
Weekly Category Variance 6,032,957
Note: Category Variance/Sum of UPC Variances 100.6%




Sum of UPC Variances 456,163
Weekly Category Variance 341,530
Note: Category Variance/Sum of UPC Variances 74.9%
51Table 5: Regressions of price/sale measures on commodity input price
FW Index Share of
of Base Weeks with Actual
Price sale in Price
KM category Paid Num Obs
Oats 1.676 10.32 0.975 25
Chicago (0.937) (34.90) (1.389)
Oranges 0.352 -2.053 0.346 31
Chicago (0.183) (1.54) (0.181)
Peanuts 0.281 -8.04 0.448 28
Charlotte (0.144) (6.88) (0.203)
Peanuts 1.45 24.16 0.174 28
Chicago (0.285) (7.36) (0.178)
Peanuts 0.545 -4.44 0.563 28
Hartford (0.235) (3.60) (0.210)
Peanuts -0.013 -17.42 0.324 28
Houston (0.100) (7.44) (0.218)
Peanuts 0.106 -5.74 0.142 28
Knoxville (0.203) (7.65) (0.155)
Peanuts 0.176 -10.4 0.521 28
Los Angeles (0.132) (7.34) (0.257)
Peanuts 1.098 -9.04 0.954 28
New York (0.195) (6.42) (0.235)
Peanuts -0.553 -18.13 0.142 28
St. Louis (0.165) (5.30) (0.292)
Peanuts 0.351 -3.4 0.607 28
West TX (0.284) (6.06) (0.333)
Share with expected
sign 0.82 0.82 1.00
Each cell is a regression. Standard errors in Parentheses
52Table 6: Regressions of Price Paid on the xed weight index (Avg List







Avg List Price 0.360 0.404 0.448
(0.16) (0.23) (0.12)
Best Price 0.666 0.482 0.469
(0.15) (0.12) (0.08)
Constant 0.002 0.014 0.013
(0.009) (0.018) (0.008)
R-squared 0.900 0.596 0.902
p value for test that
weights sum to 1
0.79 0.57 0.26
p value for test that
weights sum to 1 AND
constant = 0
0.70 0.15 0.03
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
53Table 7: Structural Estimates of Peanut Butter Price Paid, 9 cities
p-value of joint
p-value test: coecients
Constant Average Best that sum of sum to 1 and
List Price Price coecients=1 constant =0
Charlotte 0.013 0.448 0.469 0.26 0.03
(0.008) (0.119) (0.081)
Los Angeles 0.012 0.684 0.261 0.77 0.66
(0.008) (0.281) (0.140)
West Texas -0.04 0.682 0.676 0.06 0.09
(0.029) (0.339) (0.266)
Saint Louis -0.028 0.380 0.999 0.01 0.01
(0.017) (0.186) (0.174)
Chicago -0.011 0.390 0.776 0.37 0.01
(0.023) (0.146) (0.115)
New York 0.038 -0.177 0.973 0.27 0.07
(0.020) (0.253) (0.196)
Hartford -0.036 0.378 0.962 0.22 0.23
(0.034) (0.299) (0.153)
Houston 0.022 0.420 0.422 0.12 0.00
(0.011) (0.124) (0.050)
Knoxville 0.00 0.871 0.129 1.00 0.69
(0.003) (0.031) (0.024)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.







Geo Mean Price 0.390 0.429 0.461
(0.163) (0.225) (0.116)
Best Price 0.634 0.468 0.465
(0.154) (0.124) (0.078)
Constant 0.002 0.013 0.012
(0.009) (0.017) (0.008)
R-squared 0.902 0.603 0.906
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
55